UPC Confirms “Ignorance” of a Fact is Sufficient to Contest It

A recent decision by the UPC Court of Appeal in the matter of Heraeus Electronics v Vibrantz provides helpful clarity on the application of Rule 171(2) of the Rules of Procedure, and the handling of the "ignorance defence" when facts lie entirely outside a party's sphere of knowledge. Under Rule 171(2) RoP, a statement of fact made by one of the parties is held to be true unless it is "specifically contested" by another party. This rule is intended to streamline proceedings by compelling parties to substantively engage with opposing allegations rather than relying on blanket denials. Nevertheless, given the nature of the allegations in question, the Court of Appeal saw fit to address how this rule operates when a party genuinely lacks access to the necessary information to counter a claim. 

The Court established that a substantiated, concrete challenge cannot be strictly demanded of a party if the fact being asserted lies completely outside that party's sphere of knowledge and responsibility. In such instances (exemplified in this case by technical analyses of residual proprietary stocks held exclusively within an opponent's laboratory) a party is permitted to declare that it has no knowledge of a fact submitted by the other party. Crucially, the Court clarified that making this declaration of lack of knowledge does not result in the fact being deemed undisputed. Instead, it shifts the evidentiary burden back to the asserting party to prove its claim.

It is clear that this interpretation ensures procedural fairness under the UPC framework, protecting parties from being disadvantaged by opposing arguments substantiated entirely by inaccessible evidence, while maintaining the prevention of blanket denials from being used as an obstructionist tactic.

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